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Natural selection favours genes that increase an
organism’s ability to survive and reproduce. This
would appear to lead to a world dominated by selfish
behaviour. However, cooperation can be found at all
levels of biological organisation: genes cooperate in
genomes, organelles cooperate to form eukaryotic
cells, cells cooperate to make multicellular organ-
isms, bacterial parasites cooperate to overcome
host defences, animals breed cooperatively, and
humans and insects cooperate to build societies.
Over the last 40 years, biologists have developed
a theoretical framework that can explain coopera-
tion at all these levels. Here, we summarise this
theory, illustrate how it may be applied to real
organisms and discuss future directions.
The Problem of Cooperation
A behaviour is cooperative if it provides a benefit to an-
other individual and if it has evolved at least partially
because of this benefit [1]. Such behaviours pose
a problem to evolutionary theory because — all else
being equal — they would reduce the relative fitness
of the performer of that behaviour and hence be se-
lected against [2] (Figure 1). To give a specific exam-
ple, consider the star of many a nature documentary,
the meerkat. Meerkats generally live in groups of up
to 30 adults with their young. The adults of a group
can be divided into the dominant male and female,
who do most of the breeding, and the subordinates,
who help the dominants raise their offspring [3].
When one of these subordinates has found a tasty
scorpion, why should it hand it over to one of the off-
spring produced by the dominant pair? How can we
reconcile this behaviour with selfish interests, even at
the level of the gene, and the Darwinian struggle for
survival and reproduction in the natural world?
This problem also applies to economics and human
morality, with a famous example being the ‘tragedy of
the commons’ [4]: imagine a number of shepherds,
each deciding how many sheep to keep on a shared
pasture. The addition of extra sheep will have both
a benefit and a cost. The benefit is that the shepherd
will gain from extra sheep. The cost is potential over-
grazing, which can damage the pasture. However,
whilst our focal shepherd gains all of the benefit, he
pays only a fraction of the cost, which is shared be-
tween all of the shepherds. Consequently, the individ-
ual shepherd has more to gain than to lose from adding
extra sheep. The tragedy is that — as a group — all the
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Such cooperation, however, is not stable, because
each individual can gain by selfishly pursuing their
own interests.
Most attention on the problem of cooperation (see
Box 1 for glossary) has been focused on interactions
between animals. However, the same problem occurs
at all levels of biological organisation [2,5–7]. The very
existence of multicellular organisms relies upon coop-
eration between the eukaryotic cells that make them
up.The mitochondria uponwhich these eukaryotic cells
rely were once free-living prokaryotic cells but now live
cooperative lives. Separate genes, which make up the
genome, cooperate in what has been termed the ‘parlia-
ment of the genes’ [8]. The tree of life is dominated by
single-celled microorganisms that appear to perform
a huge range of cooperative behaviours [9]. For exam-
ple, the growth and survival of bacteria depend upon
excreted products that perform a variety of functions,
such as scavenging nutrients, communication, defence
and movement. The benefits of such extracellular prod-
ucts can be shared by neighbouring cells and hence
they represent a ‘public good’ that is open to the prob-
lem of cooperation [9]. Almost all of the major evolution-
ary transitions from replicating molecules to complex
animal societies have relied upon solving the problem
of cooperation being solved [7].
The Solutions
As cooperation is in evidence throughout the natural
world, there must be a solution to the problem. Theo-
retical explanations for the evolution of cooperation
(or any behaviour) are broadly classified into two cate-
gories: direct fitness benefits or indirect fitness bene-
fits [2,10–12] (Figure 2). This follows from Hamilton’s
[2] insight that individuals gain inclusive fitness
through their impact on the reproduction of related in-
dividuals (indirect fitness effects) as well as through
their impact on their own reproduction (direct fitness
effects) (Figure 3). The importance of Hamilton’s
work cannot be overstated — it is one of the few truly
fundamental advances since Darwin in our under-
standing of natural selection.
A cooperative behaviour yields direct fitness bene-
fits when the reproductive success of the actor, who
performs the cooperative behaviour, is increased. Co-
operative behaviours that benefit both the actor and
the recipient(s) of the behaviour are termed ‘mutually
beneficial’ [1]. A cooperative behaviour can be ex-
plained by indirect fitness benefits if it is directed
towards other individuals who carry the gene for coop-
eration [2]. This is usually termed ‘kin selection’ [13],
because the simplest and most common way this
could occur is if cooperation is directed at relatives,
who share genes from a common ancestor [11]. By
helping a close relative reproduce, an individual is still
passing copies of its genes on to the next generation,
albeit indirectly. Cooperative behaviours that are
costly to the actor and beneficial to the recipient are
termed ‘altruistic’ [2] and can only be explained by in-
direct fitness benefits. A key point here is that we are
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and not the consequences of every single instance.
Kin Selection and Indirect Fitness Benefits
Hamilton’s inclusive fitness (kin selection) theory
shows how altruistic cooperation can be favoured be-
tween relatives. This is encapsulated in a pleasingly
simple form by Hamilton’s rule [2], which states that
a behaviour or trait will be favoured by selection,
when rb2c>0, where c is the fitness cost to the actor,
b is the fitness benefit to the recipient, and r is their ge-
netic relatedness. Putting this inequality into words, al-
truistic cooperation can therefore be favoured if the
benefits to the recipient (b), weighted by the genetic
relatedness of the recipient to the actor (r), outweigh
the costs to the actor (c). This follows from inclusive fit-
ness theory because 2c represents the direct fitness
consequences of a social behaviour and rb the indirect
fitness consequences. Hamilton’s rule predicts greater
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Figure 1. The problem of cooperation.
In the absence of one of the mechanisms discussed in this re-
view, natural selection favours selfish individuals who do not
cooperate. Consider a population of cooperators (‘C’) in which
an uncooperative, selfish cheater (‘S’) arises through mutation
or migration. In a mixed population, the selfish cheater benefits
from the cooperative behaviour of the cooperators, without
paying the cost. Consequently, the selfish cheater has a higher
fitness than the cooperators and spreads through the popula-
tion, despite the fact that this leads to a decline in mean fitness.
(Redrawn after [104].)levels of cooperation when r or b are higher and c is
lower.
Explanations for cooperation based on indirect fit-
ness benefits, i.e. kin selection, require a sufficiently
high genetic relatedness (r) between interacting indi-
viduals. The coefficient of relatedness (r) is a statistical
concept, describing the genetic similarity between two
individuals, relative to the average similarity of all indi-
viduals in the population [11]. Hamilton [2] suggested
two possible mechanisms through which a high
relatedness could arise between social partners: kin
discrimination and limited dispersal.
Kin Selection and Kin Discrimination
The first mechanism for generating sufficiently high
relatedness to make kin selection viable is kin discri-
mination, when an individual can distinguish relatives
from non-relatives and preferentially direct aid to-
wards them (nepotism) [2]. This has been demon-
strated in several cooperatively breeding vertebrates,
such as long-tailed tits [14], where individuals that
fail to breed independently help at the nest of closer
relatives [14] (Figure 4A). In this species, individuals
distinguish between relatives and non-relatives on
the basis of vocal contact cues, which are learned
from adults during the nesting period (associative
learning) [15]. This leads to a situation in which individ-
uals tend to help relatives whom they have been asso-
ciated with during the nestling phase.
Kin selection theory also explains the variation in the
level of kin discrimination across species [16]. In con-
trast to the long-tailed tits, other cooperatively breed-
ing vertebrates, such as meerkats [17], do not show kin
discrimination when helping. The advantage of kin dis-
crimination will be positively correlated with the extent
of the benefit (b) provided by helping. In the extreme, ifBox 1
Glossary.
Actor: the focal individual performing a behaviour.
Altruism: a behaviour that is costly to the actor and beneficial to the recipient. Cost and benefit are defined on the basis of the
lifetime direct fitness consequences of a behaviour.
Cheaters: individuals who do not cooperate or who cooperate less than their fair share, but are potentially able to gain the benefit
of others cooperating.
Cooperation: a behaviour that provides a benefit to another individual (recipient), and the evolution of which has been dependent
on its beneficial effect for the recipient.
Direct fitness: the component of fitness gained from producing offspring; the component of personal fitness due to one’s own
behaviour.
Greenbeard: a hypothetical gene that causes in carriers both a phenotype that can be recognised by conspecifics (a ‘green beard’)
and a cooperative behaviour towards conspecifics who show a green beard.
Inclusive fitness: ‘‘the effect of one individual’s actions on everybody’s numbers of offspring [.] weighted by the relatedness [10];
the sum of direct and indirect fitness; the quantity maximised by Darwinian individuals.
Indirect fitness: the component of fitness gained from aiding related individuals.
Kin selection: process by which traits are favoured because of their beneficial effects on the fitness of relatives.
Mutual benefit: a benefit to both the actor and the recipient.
Mutualism: two-way cooperation between species.
Recipient: an individual who is affected by the behaviour of the focal individual.
Relatedness: a measure of the genetic similarity of two individuals, relative to the average; the statistical (least-squares)
regression of the recipient’s breeding value for a trait on the breeding value of the actor.
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Figure 2. A classification of the explana-
tions for cooperation.
Direct benefits explain mutually beneficial
cooperation, whereas indirect benefits ex-
plain altruistic cooperation. Within these
two fundamental categories, the different
mechanisms can be classified in various
ways [1,12,55,72]. These possibilities are
not mutually exclusive; for example, a sin-
gle act of cooperation could have both
direct and indirect fitness benefits or inter-
actions with relatives could be maintained
by both limited dispersal and kin discrimi-
nation. Our dividing up of conditional
enforcement strategies is for illustration
only, a detailed discussion is found
elsewhere [72].a supposedly ‘helping’ behaviour provides little or no
benefit to its recipients, then there is little or no advan-
tage in directing it towards closer relatives. This leads
to the prediction that the extent of kin discrimination
should be greater in species where a greater fitness
benefit is derived from receiving help — a pattern in-
deed observed across cooperatively breeding verte-
brate species [16] (Figure 5). Overall, the benefit that
helping brings to the recipient can explain 42% of the
variation in the extent of kin discrimination across
species.
Kin discrimination has also been found in species
that are not usually thought of from a social perspec-
tive. Dictyostelium purpureum is a unicellular slime
mould found in forest soils [18]. When starved of its
bacterial food source, the cells of this species aggre-
gate in thousands to form a multicellular, motile
‘slug’. Slugs migrate to the soil surface, where they
transform into a fruiting body composed of a stalk
structure holding aloft a ball of spores. The non-viable
stalk cells are sacrificed to aid the dispersal of the
spores. This requires explanation because coopera-
tive cells that form stalk cells could be exploited by
cheaters who avoid the stalk and instead migrate to
form spores in the fruiting body. Kin selection offers
a potential solution to this problem, because stalk cells
could gain an indirect fitness benefit from helping rel-
atives disperse. This suggests that it would be advan-
tageous for the individual amoebae to preferentially
form a slug with relatives. Indeed, kin discrimination
during slug formation has recently been observed in
D. purpureum [18]. Specifically, when two lineages
are mixed and allowed to form slugs on agar plates,
they discriminate to the extent that the average relat-
edness in fruiting bodies increases to a value of 0.8,
as opposed to the expected value of 0.5 (Figure 4B).
Kin Discrimination Cues
Kin discrimination can occur through the use of envi-
ronmental or genetic cues [19]. The most common
mechanism appears to involve environmental cues,
such as prior association or shared environment, as
in long-tailed tits and a range of other animals from
humans to ants [20,21]. In contrast, in the case of theslime mould some genetic cue of relatedness is likely
to be involved — also termed ‘kin recognition’, ‘genetic
similarity detection’, ‘matching’ or ‘tags’. In order to
detect genetic similarity, an individual must have
some cue that is genetically determined — such as
the cuticular hydrocarbon profile of an insect [22], or
the odour produced by scent glands in a mammal
[23] — and a ‘kin template’ for comparison [19]. This
kin template could be determined by the individual’s
own genotype or cues (‘self-matching’) and/or through
learning the cues of its rearing associates [23].
Kin discrimination based on genetic cues is often
unlikely to be evolutionarily stable. The reason is that
recognition mechanisms require genetic variability
(polymorphism) in order to provide a cue. However,
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Figure 3. Inclusive fitness and cooperation.
Inclusive fitness is the sum of direct and indirect fitness [2]. So-
cial behaviours affect the reproductive success of self and
others. The impact of the actor’s behaviour (yellow hands) on
its reproductive success (yellow offspring) is the direct fitness
effect. The impact of the actor’s behaviour (yellow hands) on
the reproductive success of social partners (blue offspring),
weighted by the relatedness (r) of the actor to the recipient, is
the indirect fitness effect. Inclusive fitness does not include all
of the reproductive success of relatives (blue offspring), only
that which is due to the behaviour of the actor (yellow hands).
Also, inclusive fitness does not include all of the reproductive
success of the actor (yellow offspring), only that which is due
to its own behaviour (yellow hands).
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R664individuals with common genetic variants would be
more likely to be helped, and thus more common
genes would be driven to fixation [24]. Consequently,
kin discrimination is, as it were, its own worst enemy,
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Figure 4. Kin discrimination.
(A) Kin discrimination in long-tailed tits. 96% of helpers prefer to
help at nests containing related chicks when they have the
choice of where to invest their efforts. With permission from
[14]. (B) Kin discrimination in the unicellular slime mold Discoi-
deum purpureum (social amobae) [18]. A scatter plot shows
the proportion of fluorescently labelled spores in fruiting bodies
when two isolates are placed together at equal proportions and
one is fluorescently labelled (bold). There is a greater variance in
the experimental treatment where the two isolates are different
lineages (X and Y), than in the control treatment where the iso-
lates are the same lineage. This shows that individuals preferen-
tially form fruiting bodies with members of their own lineage.
With permission from [18].eliminating the genetic variability that it requires to
work. Thus, kin discrimination based on genetic cues
is often not found where it might be expected [25–
28]. In cases where kin discrimination based upon ge-
netic cues has been observed, it can usually be argued
that there is some other selective force maintaining
variability at the recognition loci, such as host-parasite
co-evolution in the major histocompatibility complex
(MHC) of vertebrates [24]. Cue diversity may also be
maintained if there is limited dispersal, such that inter-
actants tend to be relatives anyway [24,29], as is likely
to be the case with the slime mould discussed above.
Green Beards
Indirect fitness benefits will also be obtained if co-
operation is directed towards non-relatives who share
the same cooperative gene [2,30]. Dawkins [31] illus-
trated this with a hypothetical example of a gene that
gave rise to green beards, while simultaneously
prompting individuals with green beards to preferen-
tially direct cooperation towards other green-bearded
individuals. This mechanism can also occur without a
visible tag — for example, if the cooperative gene
also caused some effect on habitat preference that
led to individuals who carried that gene settling to-
gether [30]. Consequently, although this mechanism
is usually termed a ‘greenbeard’, it more generally rep-
resents an assortment mechanism, requiring a single
gene — or a number of tightly linked genes — that
encodes both the cooperative behaviour and causes
cooperators to associate [12].
Greenbeards are likely to be rare, because cheaters
that display the green beard, or assorting behaviour,
without also performing the cooperative behaviour,
could invade and overrun the population. Furthermore,
in the absence of relatedness over the whole genome,
the altruistic greenbeard would be in conflict with
genes elsewhere in the genome, where there would
be strong selection for suppression of the greenbeard
[32,33]. One of the few cases where a cooperative
greenbeard occurs is in the slime mould Dictyostelium
discoideum, which forms fruiting bodies in a very sim-
ilar way to D. purpureum. In. D. discoideum, individual
amoebae with the csa cell-adhesion gene adhere to
each other in aggregation streams and cooperativelyKin
discrimination
Benefit of helpers
Current Biology
Figure 5. Kin discrimination and the bene-
fit of helping.
Across cooperatively breeding bird and
mammal species, helpers are more likely
to discriminate in favour of relatives
when the amount of help they provide
increases the survival of offspring to the
following year. The extent to which indi-
viduals preferentially help closer relatives
(kin discrimination) is plotted against the
benefit of helping. The significant positive
relationship between these two variables
is predicted by kin selection theory. The il-
lustration shows the laughing kookaburra,
a species which does not show kin dis-
crimination in its helping behaviour. Modi-
fied with additional data points from [16].
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[34]. It is perhaps not surprising that greenbeards
should be rare, given that the idea was not developed
as a theory to explain altruism, but as a thought ex-
periment to show that genetic relatedness — rather
than genealogical relationship per se — is the key to
kin selection.
Kin Selection and Limited Dispersal
Limited dispersal (population viscosity or structure)
can generate high degrees of relatedness between
interacting individuals because it will tend to keep
relatives together [2,5]. In this case, altruism directed
indiscriminately at neighbours could be favoured, be-
cause those neighbours are more likely to be relatives.
This mechanism has the potential to be important in
a wide range of organisms because it does not require
any mechanism of kin discrimination. Instead, all that
is required is that the level of cooperation evolves in re-
sponse to the mean relatedness between individuals
who tend to interact by chance.
The predicted role of limited dispersal has been
supported by an experimental evolution study on co-
operation in bacteria [35]. Many bacteria release side-
rophore molecules to scavenge for iron. These repre-
sent a cooperative public good: they are costly to the
individual to produce, but iron bound to siderophores
can be taken up by any cell, providing a benefit to other
individuals in the locality. When populations of the
bacteriumPseudomonas aeruginosa containing a mix-
ture of a wild-type strain that produces siderophores
and a cheater mutant that does not were maintained
in conditions that led to relatively high or low
relatedness [35], the cooperative wild-type strain out-
competed the cheater mutant strain only under condi-
tions of relatively high relatedness (Figure 6). More
generally, limited dispersal is likely to be important
for maintaining a range of public goods produced by
bacteria to help with the gathering of resources,
growth and reproduction [9].
Limited Dispersal and Kin Competition
Although limited dispersal can favour cooperation, it
will not necessarily do so [36]. The problem is that, al-
though limited dispersal can bring relatives together to
cooperate, it can also keep them together to compete
[30,37]. This competition between relatives can reduce
or even completely remove selection for cooperation
between relatives. One way of thinking about this is
that the concomitant competition reduces the benefit
(b) of helping relatives [11]. In the extreme case, there
is no point helping a brother, if their increase in fitness
comes at the cost of another brother’s reproductive
success [38]. In the simplest possible scenario, the ef-
fects of increased relatedness and increased competi-
tion exactly cancel out, such that limited dispersal has
no influence on the evolution of cooperation [39]. How-
ever, a number of factors, which are likely to be
biologically important, can reduce the competition be-
tween relatives and hence allow limited dispersal to fa-
vour cooperation [36]. For example, when cooperation
allows population expansion (as with bacterial public
goods), when relatives tend to disperse together
(‘budding viscosity’) or when the lifecycle involves aperiod of interaction with close relatives followed by
a period of dispersal before competition (‘alternating
viscosity’) [39–41].
Although it has received little empirical attention
[38], some experimental support for how competition
between relatives can select against cooperation be-
tween relatives comes from the experiment with
P. aeruginosa on siderophore production described
above [35]. Relatively low competition between rela-
tives was induced by allowing more productive groups
to make a greater contribution to the next generation,
thereby minimising local competition within groups.
Relatively high competition between relatives was ob-
tained by making all groups contribute equally to the
next generation and hence making local competition
between groups more important. As predicted by the-
ory, the cheater mutant strain was able to spread to
a higher proportion of the population when there was
greater competition between relatives (Figure 6).
More recently, it has also been realised that local com-
petition for resources not only selects against cooper-
ation, but it can select for individuals to spitefully harm
less related individuals [42], such as when the soldier
larvae of polyembryonic wasps attack and kill larvae
to which they are less related [43,44].
Don’t Forget b and c
There is often an overemphasis — both conceptually
and empirically — on the importance of the relatedness
term (r) in Hamilton’s rule and a corresponding neglect
of the benefit (b) and cost (c) terms [45,46]. To some ex-
tent, this is the case because genetic similarity can be
measured more easily than components of fitness.
However, focusing too strongly on r can lead to misun-
derstanding and confusion, because variation in b and
c can be equally important. One of the clearest cases of
such confusion arises from a consideration of why
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Figure 6. Relatedness, competition and cooperation.
An experimental study on cooperative siderophore production
in the bacteria Pseudomonas aeruginosa has shown how selec-
tion for cooperation is influenced by relatedness and the extent
of competition between relatives [35]. The proportion of coop-
erative individuals who produce siderophores is plotted against
time. The different lines represent relatively high (solid lines) and
low (dashed lines) relatedness. The different symbols represent
relatively low (circle) and high (triangle) amounts of competition
between relatives. Cooperation is favoured by higher related-
ness and lower competition between relatives. With permission
from [35].
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R666eusociality has evolved so many times in the haplodi-
ploid Hymenoptera — the ants, bees and wasps. Ham-
ilton [2,5] originally suggested that this was the case
because their haplodiploid genetics leads to female
workers being more related to their sisters (r = 0.75)
than to their offspring (r = 0.5) and hence provided a re-
latedness benefit that predisposed them to the evolu-
tion of cooperation. However, it was later shown that
this higher relatedness to sisters was exactly cancelled
by a lower relatedness to brothers (r = 0.25) relative to
sons (r = 0.5) [47]. Consequently, it has long been as-
sumed that the high frequency of eusociality in the Hy-
menoptera is due to factors that provide a high benefit-
to-cost-ratio (b/c), such as nest building, stinging and
common parental care [48,49]. However, the miscon-
ception that kin selection only predicts that r is impor-
tant still arises [50], whereas in reality, it predicts that r,
b and c are important [51].
The importance of b has been discussed above with
respect to selection for kin discrimination and the ben-
efit of helping [16] (Figure 5), and how selection for co-
operative siderophore production is reduced by local
competition between relatives [35] (Figure 6). An ele-
gant example of the importance of the cost of helping
(c) is provided by field experiments on the hairy-faced
hover wasp [52]. In nests of this species, one to ten re-
lated females form an orderly queue to reproduce. The
dominant female lays the eggs and the subordinate fe-
males forage and tend the young. High-ranked subor-
dinates were experimentally removed from the nest,
hence moving the remaining subordinates to a higher
position in the queue. This increases the relative cost
of helping, because it is more likely that the subordi-
nate will succeed to the breeding position and so en-
ergy expended on foraging could reduce resources
available for breeding, as well as decreasing the likeli-
hood of surviving to gain the breeding position. As pre-
dicted by kin selection theory [53], when individuals
were moved up the queue, they reduced the number
of foraging trips [52]. This illustrates that, as the cost
of helping increased, individuals cooperated less.
Direct Fitness Benefits
The evolution of cooperation does not only depend
upon kin selection and indirect fitness benefits — co-
operation can also provide a direct fitness benefit to
the cooperating individual [54]. In this case, coopera-
tion is mutually beneficial and not altruistic [1]. We di-
vide the direct fitness explanations for cooperation
into two categories (Figure 2). First, cooperation may
provide a benefit, as a by-product, or automatic
consequence, of an otherwise ‘self-interested’ act
[45,55]. For example, cooperation could lead to an in-
crease in group size, which increases the survival of
everyone — including the individual who performs
the cooperative behaviour — due to larger groups be-
ing better at avoiding predators or competing with
other groups [56]. Second, there may be some mech-
anism for enforcing cooperation by rewarding cooper-
ators or punishing cheaters [57]. It can also be useful to
distinguish enforcement mechanisms that are behav-
iourally inflexible from those that are adjusted condi-
tionally in response to the level of cooperation. In the
latter case, the benefit to the actor depends upon therecipient adjusting their behaviour towards the actor
in response to the actor’s behaviour.
By-Product Benefits
Cooperation may provide some automatic benefit
without enforcement. One way this could occur is if
members of a group have some shared interest in
cooperation. In many cooperatively breeding verte-
brates — such as meerkats — a larger group size
can provide a benefit to all the members of the group
through an increase in survival, foraging success or
the likelihood of winning conflicts with other groups
[58]. In such a case, subordinate individuals can be se-
lected to help rear offspring that are not their own, in
order to increase group size — a process termed
‘group augmentation’ [56]. Selection for such helping
is further increased if there is a chance that the subor-
dinate will obtain dominance in the group at some later
point, because they would then have a larger number
of helpers themselves. The advantages of group aug-
mentation would be greatest for the sex that is most
likely to remain and breed in the natal group, which
provides an explanation for why the level of helping
is greatest in that particular sex for birds and mammals
[59]. Similar benefits of increased individual success in
larger groups have been suggested to be important in
other cooperative organisms, such as ants and social
spiders [60,61]. Things can get more complicated if
the individuals in the group are related, because then
by-product benefits can at the same time provide indi-
rect fitness benefits, either because the actor helps
a relative [56] or because the by-product benefits are
shared with relatives [62].
Direct fitness benefits also play a role in cooperative
breeding in the wasp Polistes dominulus [63]. In this
species, colonies are initiated by one or a few foun-
dress females that form a dominance hierarchy with
the dominant laying most of the eggs and the subordi-
nates carrying out most of the more risky foraging. It
was found that 35% of subordinates were unrelated
to the dominant female. These subordinates gain sig-
nificant direct fitness benefits from staying and helping
on the nest because dominants suffer an appreciable
mortality, and so there is approximately a 10% chance
that a subordinate will have become the dominant in
the group by the time the workers emerge [63]. It is
unlikely that subordinates are merely helping non-
relatives by accident, because there is sufficient
between-individual variation in cuticular lipids to allow
subordinates to distinguish relatives from unrelated
nest-mates [64]. Thus, selection could have acted to
reduce or remove cooperative behaviour when subor-
dinates form a colony with non-relatives.
Enforced Cooperation
Cooperation can be enforced if there is a mechanism
for rewarding cooperators or punishing cheaters
[54,57,65]. Trivers [54] emphasised that cooperation
could be favoured in reciprocal interactions with indi-
viduals preferentially aiding those that have helped
them in the past. In this case, cooperation provides
a direct fitness benefit, as it is only favoured if the short
term cost of being cooperative is outweighed by the
long term benefit of receiving cooperation [1,12].
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provides a direct fitness benefit, it is mutually benefi-
cial and not altruistic. Consequently, reciprocity [66]
or reciprocal cooperation [65] are more appropriate
terms [1]. Here, we use the term reciprocity to refer
to cooperation preferentially directed at cooperative
individuals, either directly (‘help those that help you’)
or indirectly (‘help those that help others’) [54,67,68].
Although such reciprocity has attracted a huge
amount of theoretical attention, it is thought to be gen-
erally unimportant outside of humans [69–71]. Our use
of the term ‘reciprocity’ differentiates it from other
cases of enforcement that also rely on behavioural
flexibility and that have been variously termed ‘punish-
ment’, ‘policing’, ‘sanctions’, ‘partner-switching’ and
‘partner choice’ [1,55,57,72] (Figure 2). It is beyond
the scope of this review to sort the relationships be-
tween these different mechanisms [72]. In some cases,
the term ‘reciprocity’ is used more generally to cover
all these instances [12].
Enforcement has been suggested to be important in
a number of vertebrate species. One example is found
in meerkats, where the dominant female suppresses
reproduction in her subordinates [73]. If a subordinate
female becomes pregnant when the dominant is also
pregnant, then the dominant is likely to subject the
subordinate to aggressive attack and temporarily evict
her from the group, which usually leads to abortion of
the subordinate’s litter. Enforcement has also been
suggested to be an important selective force for coop-
eration in humans. In one study, students were split
into groups of four to play a public goods game for
cash prizes, where each person could contribute mon-
etary units to a group project [74]. The experiment was
repeated with and without punishment; punishment
was incorporated by allowing individuals to pay money
to have units deduced from other players, after they
were informed about each other’s investments. As ex-
pected, punishment led to higher levels of cooperation
[74] (Figure 7A).
Enforcement can also explain cooperation between
species. An elegant example is provided by the cleaner
fish Labroides dimidiatus, which removes and eats ec-
toparasites from its client reef fish. Although parasite
removal and food acquisition are clearly beneficial to
the client and cleaner, respectively, there is a conflict,
because the cleaners would prefer to eat the tissue or
mucus of their hosts, which is costly to the host [75].
The clients use three mechanisms to suppress this
conflict and enforce cooperative feeding on ectopara-
sites only: avoiding cleaners that they have observed
cheating (partner choice), leaving for another cleaner
(partner switching), and aggressively chasing the
cleaner (punishment) [75,76]. Observational and ex-
perimental data suggest that cleaner fish are more
cooperative and less likely to feed on mucus after
punishment [75,76].
Why Enforce?
Whilst it is clear that behaviours such as punishment or
policing favour cooperation, it is sometimes less obvi-
ous why they will be favoured by selection. In order to
be favoured, such behaviours must provide a direct or
an indirect fitness benefit to the punisher [77,78]. Thesimplest way in which they could provide a direct
fitness advantage is if the behaviours led to the ter-
mination of interactions with relatively uncooperative
individuals (ostracism) and hence allowed interactions
to be focused on more cooperative individuals
[57,65,79–81]. This mechanism appears to be operat-
ing in the cleaner fish discussed above, the legume-
rhizobia interaction (see below), the Yucca-Yucca
moth interaction [82] and in humans [83]. In meerkats,
pregnant subordinates will kill other young — even
those of the dominant — and so the dominant in-
creases the survival of her offspring by harassing and
evicting pregnant subordinates [73]. A more compli-
cated possibility is that the punished individuals
change their behaviour in response to punishment,
and are more likely to cooperate with the punisher in
future interactions [84]. The relative importance of
such punishment remains a major question — it is at
work in cleaner fish and could be important in other
cooperatively breeding vertebrates or humans.
Enforcement could also be favoured if it provides an
indirect fitness benefit [77,78,85]. The simplest way
this could occur is by reducing the fitness of individ-
uals who are competing with relatives and hence free-
ing up resources for relatives. In some ants, bees and
wasps, a fraction of the workers lay their own eggs
[86]. Other workers frequently do not tolerate such
selfish behaviour and selectively cannibalise or ‘police’
eggs laid by workers. This behaviour is selected for be-
cause the policing workers can be more related to the
sons of the queen than to the sons of the other workers
and because cheating workers raising their own sons
can reduce the colony’s overall productivity [87].
Across species, it has been shown that there are
higher levels of worker cooperation at which policing
is more common and effective. Specifically, the pro-
portion of workers who lay eggs is negatively corre-
lated with the probability of worker laid eggs being
killed [86] (Figure 7B). One way of conceptualising
this is that policing reduces the fitness gains of cheat-
ing, which is the same as reducing the cost (c) of coop-
erating in Hamilton’s rule.
Fixed Enforcement Strategies
The two previous sections emphasise how coopera-
tion can be enforced by conditional enforcement of be-
haviour in response to the level of cooperation shown
by others. However, cooperation can also be enforced
with fixed strategies that limit the opportunity for com-
petition or cheating [8,57]. If opportunities for compe-
tition or cheating are limited, individuals can only
increase their own success by increasing the success
of their group [57]. Consequently, any mechanism that
aligns reproductive interests or represses competition
within groups will select for higher levels of coopera-
tion. Fair meiosis may be an example of such a mecha-
nism, selected for because it aligns the reproductive
interests of genes in a genome [8]. Although selfish
genes that increase their own transmission rate can
arise and spread, there is selection for them to be sup-
pressed by genes elsewhere in the genome [88]. Other
examples of mechanisms that may have evolved to re-
duce conflict within organisms include separating
symbionts into reproductive germ line lineages, and
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Figure 7. Enforcing cooperation.
(A) Humans show higher levels of cooper-
ation in economic games when there are
opportunities to punish individuals who
do not cooperate. Reproduced with per-
mission from [74]. (B) Lower levels of
worker reproduction (cheating) are ob-
served in wasp and bee species where
worker policing is more effective [86].
The effectiveness of policing is measured
by probability of worker-laid eggs being
killed relative to queen-laid eggs. Repro-
duced with permission from [86]. (C) Le-
gumes sanction rhizobia bacteria that do
not fix nitrogen for them [91]. The plant
reduces the oxygen supply to nodules
where air (N2-O2) is replaced by a gas mix-
ture (Ar-O2) which contains only traces of
nitrogen, thus leading to a decrease in
rhizobial growth. Reproduced with per-
mission from [91].non-reproductive, somatic lineages [89] as well as the
uniparental transmission of cytoplasmic genes, such
as mitochondrial genes [90].
Things Aren’t Always So Simple
Although we have emphasised how the mechanisms
favouring cooperation can be divided up, these
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and there is
considerable scope for interactions between them.
The examples above have demonstrated how punish-
ment or policing can favour higher levels of coopera-
tion due to direct or indirect fitness benefits. Such
mechanisms of enforcement cut across the direct-in-
direct fitness distinction, because they can alter the
relative cost and benefit of cooperating — the b and
c of Hamilton’s rule [12]. In many cases, both direct
and indirect benefits may be involved. For example,
if the rhizobia in a root nodule do not provide nitrogento their leguminous host plant, the plant reduces the
growth rate of the bacteria by decreasing oxygen sup-
ply [91] (Figure 7C). In this case, each rhizobium cell is
selected to fix nitrogen to avoid both itself and its rel-
atives within the nodule being sanctioned. Another
complication is that just as competition between re-
latives reduces kin selection for cooperation, local
competition for resources can also reduce the direct
fitness benefits of cooperation [92].
Origin versus Maintenance of Cooperation
It is useful to distinguish between the evolutionary
forces favouring the origin and the subsequent elabo-
ration and maintenance of a trait. However, this dis-
tinction is rarely made for cooperation. One issue is
that the selective force initially responsible for the evo-
lution of cooperation may differ from that driving the
observed level of cooperation. In particular, even
when there could eventually be a direct fitness benefit
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eration to spread initially. This is for instance the case
with reciprocity [65], punishment [77,78] and group
augmentation [56]. It is, therefore, likely that some level
of cooperation may initially arise due to factors such as
kin selection or shared interests, and that only after
this can punishment or sanctions select for higher
levels of cooperation [77]. Analogous arguments
have been made for cooperatively breeding verte-
brates, social insects and rhizobia [58,81,86]. Another
issue is that any mechanism that reduced symbiont di-
versity would provide a longer term benefit by more
closely aligning the reproductive interests of the sym-
biont with their host [93]. However, this would only be
selected for if it provided an immediate benefit. For ex-
ample, fungus-growing ants in the genus Acromyrmex
remove new strains of fungi from their nest, because it
leads to a costly incompatibility reaction with their res-
ident fungus strain [94]. In an accompanying review
in this issue, Boomsma discusses how mating sys-
tems can influence the origin and maintenance of
cooperation [95].
What We Need
It is more important to start with what we don’t need
[96]. First, we do not need to keep reinventing the
wheel with more theoretical models that incorrectly
claim to provide a new mechanism for the evolution
of cooperation [12,97,98]. This has especially been
a problem with models that examine limited dispersal
or group structures [99–103] and which are, therefore,
just reinventing kin selection [12,97,98]. If links with ex-
isting theory are not clarified, this misleads and causes
confusion. This is illustrated by a recent review which
suggests five mechanisms for the evolution of cooper-
ation [104] — three of these were just different ways of
modelling the same thing (kin selection) [97,105–107],
two were different forms of reciprocity, and hence un-
likely to be important outside of humans, and most di-
rect fitness benefits for cooperation were ignored.
Second, we do not need redefinitions of terms that al-
ready have specific and useful meanings. For example
the confusion that has been generated by the various
redefinitions of ‘altruism’ since Hamilton’s [2] original
and extremely useful definition [1].
Third, we do not need more convoluted theoretical
analyses of games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
snow drift, etc. This approach was extremely useful
in the 1970s and 1980s for illustrating that coopera-
tion was a problem and provides a useful framework
for conducting experiments with humans. However,
games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and its solution
with various forms of reciprocity make a large number
of extremely specific and often unrealistic assump-
tions. We now have much more general, powerful
and often simpler methods for analysing the evolution
of social behaviours [11,108–110]. Furthermore, these
other methods allow the biology to lead the mathemat-
ics [111], rather than contorting real systems into the
form of an artificial game [112,113], and hence facili-
tate the empirical application and testing of theory.
Fourth, we do not need to waste more time on the
group selection debate, which was resolved over 20years ago [10,114]. Group selection is just an alterna-
tive way of doing the maths — most workers prefer
the kin selection approach because it is usually sim-
pler, more powerful, easier to link with empirical stud-
ies and avoids semantic confusion [1].
Now, what do we need? First, we need greater inte-
gration between theoretical and empirical work [115].
Much theoretical work is aimed at developing very
general models that can be difficult to apply to real
systems. A greater emphasis is needed on the devel-
opment of models that can be applied to and tested
in specific systems [53,116]. The usefulness of this ap-
proach is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the
most successful branches of social-evolution theory,
such as sex-ratio evolution, are those where theory
and empirical work have been highly integrated
[11,22,47,117]. The need for testable predictions is
particularly great for many direct fitness explanations
for cooperation. In addition, theory is required to
make better use of real data, by providing methods
for estimating parameters such as the various compo-
nents of inclusive fitness [118], and the extent to which
competition between relatives reduces selection for
cooperation [36,119].
Second, the possible advantages of less traditional
study systems need to be exploited. Previous empiri-
cal work has focused on animals, and within them,
the Hymenoptera and the cooperatively breeding ver-
tebrates. Presumably this is because of the complex-
ities offered by haplodiploid genetics, an excuse for
birdwatching or the glamour of working with fluffy
mammals. Far less attention is applied to other spe-
cies such as termites [120], social spiders [60] or
aphids [121]. The amazing opportunities offered by
bacteria and other microbes have only just been real-
ised, let alone exploited [9]. Furthermore, apart from
work on selfish genetic elements and their suppres-
sors [88], far less attention has been paid to the prob-
lems of cooperation that occupy lower levels among
the major evolutionary transitions, such as the evolu-
tion of multicellularity [122].
Third, we need greater unification. In some cases,
there is surprisingly little interaction between empirical
workers and theoreticians who work on different taxa
or in different areas. This lack of unification can lead
to the semantic and reinvention-of-theory problems
discussed above. Inclusive fitness theory [2] provides
a relatively unified body of theory on the evolution of
cooperation [1,12,32,55,57], and the major aim for the
future should be to show how this links and differenti-
ates explanations for cooperation across various taxa
and levels of biological organisation.
Fourth, we need to emphasise both the distinction
and interplay between mechanistic (proximate) and
evolutionary (ultimate or selective value) approaches.
It has long been appreciated in the animal behaviour
[123] and evolutionary [124] literature that these are
complementary and not competing approaches. In-
deed, failing to discriminate these approaches can
lead to considerable confusion, as illustrated by the re-
cent literature on cooperation in humans [1]. However,
this distinction has also led to research on evolutionary
questions tending to ignore mechanistic issues. This is
a problem when an understanding of mechanism can
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R670help explain the pattern and precision of adaptation
[125]. For example, the ability with which ants can
recognise kin has been shown to depend upon mech-
anistic constraints imposed by the cuticular hydro-
carbon mechanism underlying this behaviour: ants
misestimate how many times their queen has mated
when her mates share the same cuticular hydrocarbon
profile [22].
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